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T
he U.S. economy runs on debt. Not
counting the debt of financial institu-
tions (which issue debt to some parties
while holding others’), the total debt
outstanding in the U.S. economy is
almost $19 trillion, or upwards of
$67,000 for each U.S. resident. But this debt is not
static in any sense: each day about $2.5 trillion worth
of debt is incurred, paid off, or transferred through
the operation of the nation’s various payment sys-
tems.1 This vast and incessant reshuffling of finan-
cial relationships—from $10 credit card purchases
to $100 million bond trades—makes possible the
complex patterns of exchange necessary for the
economy to thrive and grow.
Payment systems based on “inside money,” or the
transfer of debt (such as checks, credit cards, and wire
transfers), are crucial to exchange because they allow
one debt claim (for example, a utility bill, a mortgage
payment, or a trading position in the financial mar-
kets) to be extinguished by the transfer of another
(bank deposits). This type of payment increases eco-
nomic efficiency because it induces a sort of economy-
wide netting out of obligations, with two main bene-
fits. The first benefit, well known to economists, is
that the use of inside money can economize on the
amount of cash—which pays no interest and hence
bears an implicit tax—needed to carry out exchange.
A second benefit of inside-money systems, which
this article focuses on, is that these systems, by allow-
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ing some claims to effectively cancel one another,
help ensure that outstanding debts that remain are
those for which there is a strong incentive to repay.
Key to this second benefit is the idea that certain
transfers have the property of finality. Transfers of
inside money, meaning nowadays the transfer of
money held as bank deposits, are supported by a well-
developed legal infrastructure consisting of laws, reg-
ulations, and private contracts. This infrastructure
determines, among other things, the finality of a given
transfer—the circumstances under which the transfer
of an asset (in practice, almost always a deposit or
line of credit with a bank) extinguishes a debt.
Without finality, a transfer of bank funds would not
necessarily constitute a payment and “money in the
bank” would not function as money. When a person
sends a check to pay a utility bill, for example, she
expects that her debt to the utility company will be
discharged so long as there are sufficient funds in her
account to cover the check.2
While the concept of finality is well understood
by lawyers and payment system practitioners, it has
received relatively little attention from economists.
This article partially rectifies this omission by pro-
viding a basic analysis of finality and its role in facil-
itating exchange. The discussion shows how finality
can increase economic efficiency by suitably allo-
cating the risks associated with decentralized
exchange.3 In some cases, finality may be necessary
for exchange to occur at all. It will also be argued2 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
In the model economy, depicted in Chart 1, there
are three people in a typical business setting: a sup-
plier, A; a merchant, B; and a consumer, C. Supplier A
can provide merchant B with certain goods, “sup-
plies.” If B has access to supplies, then she can trans-
form these into salable merchandise. Consumer C
would like to purchase the merchandise from B
right away, but is momentarily strapped for cash.
However, C expects a cash inflow at some later date.
How should exchange be organized in this simple
economy? In modern circumstances, both B and C
could apply for bank loans. With the loan proceeds,
B could buy supplies from A, and C could buy mer-
chandise from B. Using the proceeds of her sale to C,
B could then repay her loan.5 Finally, C would repay
his loan as his income becomes available. This type of
arrangement would have been problematic in earlier
times, however, as there were relatively few banks,
and often these could not directly transfer funds
outside of a given city. So for long-distance trade
other arrangements had to be developed.
Returning to the model, trade could proceed if C
were willing to wait until he has enough cash to
purchase the merchandise. But if C values having
the merchandise now rather than later, there may
be better arrangements available. One alternative
would be a credit chain (see Possibility 1 in Chart 1).
B could issue debt to A in return for supplies, and C
could issue debt to B in return for merchandise.
Both forms of debt claims are payable later, mean-
ing when C’s cash arrives. When this happens, B
presents C with the debt C issued earlier and A pre-
sents B with his. If B and C are reliable creditors, C
can pay B, and B can use the proceeds from this
payment to pay A. In an environment where credi-
tors’ rights are limited, however, there is a good
chance that B may be unreliable. Because B no
longer has possession of the merchandise when the
time comes for her to repay, A’s ability to coerce
payment by using the merchandise as collateral is
that finality is best understood as a general concept
rather than a specific rule or type of risk allocation.
Many things can go wrong in the process of decen-
tralized exchange (default and fraud, for example),
so that the notion of finality appropriate in one set
of circumstances will not necessarily be the right
one in other circumstances. Choosing the degree of
finality for a given situation involves a trade-off
between the benefits of finality versus the costs
that can arise when an erroneous or fraudulent
transfer occurs.
A Simple Model of Transferable Debt and Finality
O
ne can better understand the role of payment
finality in today’s economy by understanding its
role in a simpler context. To this end, one can ana-
lyze a model in which it is desirable for people to
make payments by transferring debt. In the model
economy, unlike present-day economies, there are
no banks, but individuals can transfer debt that they
issue on their own. While this model is not appropri-
ate for most modern situations, it has some historical
verisimilitude. In earlier times, the debt of private
individuals and firms (often in the form of bills of
exchange) commonly circulated as a type of money.
This system—payment in negotiable instruments—
originated in the Low Countries during the seven-
teenth century and was subsequently adopted in
many other countries, including the United States.4
1. Estimates of nonfinancial debt are available from the Federal Reserve’s H.6 data release (available on-line at www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/h6). Data on payment flows, not counting cash, are available from the Bank for International Settlements (2001).
2. One could attempt to pay such a bill by offering another good or service, that is, by barter. This possibility is acknowledged in
the Uniform Commercial Code, but since a match between the needs of the buyer and seller is highly unlikely, as a practical
matter virtually all payments are in money. See also the discussion in the Task Force on Stored-Value Cards (1997, 673–74).
3. Much of the discussion below is based on Kahn and Roberds (2001). Technical details of this article’s arguments can be found in
that paper.
4. See, for example, Kohn (1999) on the origins of negotiable instruments. Rogers (1995) explains how these instruments were incor-
porated into English and eventually American commercial law. Payment in bills of exchange enjoyed something of a revival in Russia
during the 1990s (see Andrews 1997). There, short-term obligations of firms known as veksels often functioned as a makeshift form
of money. Ickes (1998) describes how the use of veksels arose partly from the need to limit opportunities for default.
5. As in the arrangements discussed below, for this scheme to work, B must have an incentive to repay her loan. In modern set-
tings, banks and other lenders have a variety of legal devices available to help guarantee repayment. For example, where the
merchandise consists of automobiles, a lender may retain title to the automobiles until they are sold.
Payment by transfer of debt is desirable in the
model economy because it can short-circuit
credit chains and thereby lessen the chances
for opportunistic default.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
CHART 1
Possible Arrangements for Trade in a Simple Model Economy




1. A sends supplies to B and receives B’s debt in return.
2. B sends merchandise to C and receives C’s debt in return.
3. B presents C’s debt for redemption; C pays cash to B (or defaults).
4. A presents B’s debt for redemption; B pays cash to A (or defaults).




1. A sends supplies to B and receives B’s debt in return.
2. B sends merchandise to C and receives C’s debt in return.
3. A presents B’s debt for redemption.
4. B transfers C’s debt to A (or defaults).






















limited. In such cases the credit chain may fail: B
may take C’s money and run.
If transferable debt is introduced into the model
(see Possibility 2 in Chart 1), another alternative
becomes available: in lieu of cash, B can use C’s debt
to settle with A. That is, suppose that A grants credit
to B but that both agree that the credit will be short-
term and that B’s debt to A can be discharged by the
transfer of a third party’s (such as C’s) debt to A. B
then sells merchandise to C in return for debt. In con-
trast to the earlier situation, however, B does not hold
C’s debt but instead passes (at least some portion of)
C’s debt to A in order to repay her short-term loan.
Then, when C’s cash becomes available, C pays A
directly, avoiding a possible default by B.
Clearly, the desirability of this sort of scheme
would depend on certain conditions being satisfied.
First, C must be a stronger credit risk than B; for
example, C could be wealthier or less indebted than
B. Also, since C gains possession of merchandise
in return for issuing debt, it could be that A could pre-
vent C from making full use of the merchandise if B
defaults on her debt. Second, B must have an incen-
tive to hand over C’s debt to A. Such an incentive will
exist if, in case B defaults on her obligation to A, A
may restrict B’s ability to collect on C’s obligation. The
earlier widespread use of transferable debt suggests
that these conditions were often satisfied in practice.
In summary, payment by transfer of debt is
desirable in the model economy because it can
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fraud or default. While a formal description of
negotiability is somewhat involved, for the present
purposes the two most essential aspects of nego-
tiability are the ideas of “indorsement” and of a
“holder in due course” (see Winn 1998 for a more
complete discussion).6
Initially, a negotiable instrument could be trans-
ferred only by an indorsement or signature of the
payee.7 The indorsement implied a conditional lia-
bility: if the original debtor could not pay, then the
indorser’s obligation was not discharged and the
indorser would become liable for the obligation.8 In
other words, a payment in third-party debt was final
only if the third party actually honored the debt. In
the model, for example, B could pay A by indorsing
over C’s debt to A, but such a transfer would be final
only if C made the promised payment.9
Somewhat paradoxically, the indorsement require-
ment increased the acceptability of debt instruments
in exchange by limiting the finality of their transfer.
The implied contingent liability for a third party’s
debt served as a powerful incentive for would-be
transferors of such debt to screen the quality of any
debt they might want to transfer. In his discussion
of different forms of finality, Mengle (1990) classi-
fies this type of loss-allocation rule as obeying a
“least-cost-avoider” principle—liability is assigned
to the party able to avoid the loss in question (here,
fraud or default on a third party’s debt) at least cost.
The indorsement rule, in effect, applied this principle
through the presumption that someone attempting
to pay with a third party’s debt would know more
about the quality of that debt than someone receiv-
ing the debt in payment.
While indorsement amounted to a weakening of
finality, paying a debt by indorsing someone else’s
debt still represented an improvement over simple
credit chains. As long as the original debtor (such
as party C in Chart 1) honored his debt, intermedi-
ate parties (such as party B) were in effect removed
from the credit chain. This removal reduced the
need for payments in cash (coin or precious metal)
and limited the scope for opportunistic default.
Only when the original debtor could or would not
pay did the chain of obligations come into play, and
such defaults were relatively rare.
Indorsement served to limit the scope for buyer-
side fraud, that is, fraud that would result from a
buyer passing on a low-quality or forged debt instru-
ment to a seller. The doctrine of a holder in due
course played a similar role in limiting opportuni-
ties for fraud by the seller. That is, a buyer who
paid for a purchase with negotiable debt could not
repudiate that debt, when the debt was presented
short-circuit credit chains and thereby lessen the
chances for opportunistic default. But some fail-
ures in this process can occur in even the best-
designed payment system. Rules governing pay-
ment finality are then needed to sort out who
bears the losses. The discussion below will show
how these rules can vary across different payment
systems. Nonetheless, all of these arrangements
share the fundamental feature, in the course of




ohn (1999) relates the failure of some early
attempts to use transferable debt as a form of
payment. One of the most critical problems was
that of adverse selection; that is, when a debtor can
settle a debt by transferring the debt of a third
party to his creditor, there is always a temptation to
pay with a lower-quality or even fraudulent instru-
ment. In the context of the model, for example, the
merchant B might try to settle a debt with supplier
A by tendering the debt of a risky or nonexistent
third party, C, or by forging the debt of a legitimate
third party.
In response to such problems, societies had to
develop a workable set of rules concerning liability
in cases where there was a breakdown in the rela-
tionship among the three parties (buyer, seller, and
third-party debtor). In other words, rules were
needed to decide when a transfer (or a promised
transfer) of debt discharged an obligation and when
it did not. Since a transfer of coin would have
unconditionally discharged the obligation, such
rules effectively determined when debt would func-
tion as money.
The set of rules that resulted led to the estab-
lishment of the legal concept of negotiability, a
concept which survives to some extent even today.
Debt that was issued and transferred according to
these rules was negotiable, or generally acceptable
in exchange, because merchants understood in
advance how losses would be allocated in case of
The introduction of negotiable debt greatly
increased the efficiency of long-distance
trade. In addition to providing strong incen-
tives for repayment of debts, negotiability
economized on the use of costly coin.6. In the legal literature, the spelling “indorsement” is preferred to “endorsement.”
7. A person who received the debt in this manner (an indorsee) could transfer it to another party by indorsing it again.
Instruments designed to be transferable without indorsement, such as bank notes, were not widely used until later.
8. In fact, the original debtor was most often the acceptor of a bill of exchange, that is, the party who agreed to be responsible
for its payment.
9. In theory the promised payment was always due in coin, but in practice some netting of payments occurred.
10. There are numerous ways checks can clear—by direct presentment (say, through a courier), through a private clearinghouse
arrangement, or through the Federal Reserve System.
11. There are also different ways in which a check can settle, including settlement through a private clearinghouse or corre-
spondent arrangement.
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by a good-faith third party, by claiming that the
goods paid for with the debt were faulty or nonex-
istent. For example, in the model this principle
would mean that if C issued debt to B in order to
pay for merchandise and B subsequently trans-
ferred that debt to A, C would have to honor the
debt even if the merchandise were somehow defec-
tive (though C could still try to recover damages
from B). As long as A had obtained C’s debt in
return for delivering goods to B in a legitimate
transaction (not a sham transaction and without
knowledge of fraud by B), then A would be a holder
in due course of C’s debt, with full rights to enforce
the debt claim.
As with indorsement, this holder-in-due-course
feature made negotiable debt more acceptable in
exchange. In contrast to indorsement, however, this
process was accomplished by extending the set of
circumstances in which a debt transfer was final.
The effect was to give buyers a strong incentive to
screen the reliability of potential sellers and, con-
sequently, an incentive to limit the incidence of
seller-side fraud. Again, this allocation of losses can
be defended as an application of the least-cost-
avoider principle.
The introduction of negotiable debt greatly
increased the efficiency of long-distance trade. In
addition to providing strong incentives for repay-
ment of debts, negotiability economized on the use
of costly coin. Payment in negotiable debt thus
allowed merchants to conduct a larger volume of
trade than would have otherwise been possible.
Many of the underlying ideas of these early pay-
ment arrangements, particularly rules concerning
finality, remain relevant today. With appropriate
modifications, these ideas have been incorporated
into more modern and familiar systems.
Transferable Debt in Modern Payment Systems
H
istory shows that payment systems based on
the circulation of negotiable debt worked rea-
sonably well, but their use was limited to whole-
sale transactions. A system based largely on the
perceived value of a signature was bound to be
restricted to those individuals whose wealth and
reputation were well known within the merchant
community. By contrast, modern payment systems
are widespread (if not quite universal) in their cov-
erage: anyone with a bank account can pay anyone
else with a bank account, without using cash. This
arrangement is possible in part because banks have
established an infrastructure that allows them to
efficiently clear payments but also because there
are well-understood rules that govern the finality
of payments across banks.
To see how payment might work in a more
modern context, consider the previous example of
the supplier, the merchant, and the consumer. In a
modern situation, each of the three parties would
have his or her own bank account (see Chart 2),
and trade would typically be financed by banks.
That is, merchant B would obtain her supplies
from supplier A by means of an inventory loan
from her bank (that is, Bank II in Chart 2).
Consumer C could also take out a loan from his
bank (Bank III) to purchase merchandise from B.
B and C would make their respective payments
through traditional channels, say, by writing a
check. B’s check would effectively transfer an
asset, her credit line with Bank II, to A’s account at
Bank I while C’s check would transfer his credit with
Bank III to B’s account at Bank II (see Chart 2c).
B could then use funds received from C to pay off
her inventory loan from Bank II. With each check
payment, the relevant check would be presented
to the check writer’s bank for payment.10 These
obligations would typically be settled by transfers
of “cash” (for example, by transfer of funds in each
paying bank’s account at the Federal Reserve).11
Ultimately, C would repay his loan to Bank III, and
A would draw down his funds at Bank I, complet-
ing the cycle of trade.
As in the earlier example, the efficiency of this
system derives partly from the fact that the middle
party B does not have to pay cash for her supplies
so long as she can pay off one type of debt (her
inventory loan from Bank II) with another (essen-
tially, with C’s deposit at Bank III). The system6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
CHART 2
Trade with Checks
2a: Flow of Goods
B





1. B issues debt to (obtains inventory loan from) Bank II; C obtains loan from Bank III.
2. A sends supplies to B in return for a check drawn on B’s account.
3. B’s check is deposited into Bank I; Bank I presents B’s check for payment.
4. Bank II pays B’s check and debits B’s account; A can withdraw funds as needed.
5. B sends merchandise to C in return for a check drawn on C’s account.
6. B deposits C’s check into her account at Bank II; Bank II presents C’s check for payment.
7. Bank III pays C’s check.
8. Bank II debits B’s account and B’s loan is repaid.
9. C realizes cash inflow and repays loan to Bank III.
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would not work nearly as well if each bank had to
settle every payment one-for-one by transfer of
reserves. But since on a normal business day a bank
will have many incoming and outgoing funds trans-
fers, on net the transfer of reserve balances neces-
sary for interbank settlements is quite small relative
to the gross volume of payments.12
Trade based on payment in bank funds is also
desirable because it helps limit opportunities for
default. Requiring middle parties (such as B in
Chart 2) to pay in bank debt allows for reduced
credit exposure to such parties as compared to a
trading arrangement based on open credit chains.
In other words, suppliers (such as A in Chart 2)
need not wait for repayment until their customers’
customers can afford to pay in cash but instead can
count on immediate repayment or repayment after
a short, fixed term. Banks end up bearing the residual
credit risk in these arrangements (in the Chart 2
example, Bank III must bear the risk that C will not
repay his loan), but banks are usually well equipped
to bear such risks, having both good information
about potential borrowers’ creditworthiness and
ample legal clout to enforce their creditors’ claims
in the courts.
The Role of Finality in Check Payment
M
odern payment systems are useful because of
their ubiquity, but the large volume and scope
of payments means that there are many opportuni-
ties for things to go wrong.13 In the case of check
payments, for example, checks are readily forged,
altered, or written on insufficient funds. Who bears
the losses in such cases?
In the case of checks, the rules for finality are at
first glance not too different from those that gov-
erned the circulation of negotiable debt hundreds of
years ago.14 Technically, checks are still regarded as
negotiable instruments, and much of the law involv-
ing check payment is still based on classical concepts
of negotiability. In particular, while the concept of
holder in due course is of limited applicability in
modern situations (see for example, Mann 1999,
445–47) the notion of indorsement and the condi-
tional liability that it implies are still relevant. In most
cases, check payments are not final until they have
been settled between the banks involved. For exam-
ple, a bank may give a depositor conditional access
to funds on a deposited check before payment has
been finalized between banks. But by indorsing a
check at the time of its deposit, a depositor recog-
nizes his contingent liability in case the check is not
good (drawn on insufficient funds or a nonexis-
tent account, forged, and so on). In other words, in
theory at least, the finality of a check payment made
in 2002 is not terribly different than that of a bill-of-
exchange payment made in 1602.
The implied risk allocations can be quite different
in practice, however. For example, the check collec-
tion system no longer relies on examining indorse-
ments and knowing the indorsers as a means of
ensuring that a check is good. Anyone can indorse a
check, and checks, unlike some earlier types of
negotiable instruments, are payable on demand, or
without delay. For many types of checks, banks may
try to insulate themselves against fraud risk by
delaying availability of a check deposit, but there
are legal limits to this practice. The Expedited
Funds Availability Act of 1987, which is implemented
by Federal Reserve Regulation CC, requires banks
to release deposited funds according to specific
deadlines.15 It is sometimes difficult for banks to
verify whether checks will be honored within the
time of the required deadlines, and when checks
are dishonored in such cases it is often the payee’s
bank (the depositary bank) that bears the loss.
These losses can be substantial: a 1995 survey of
banks estimated banks’ aggregate losses from check
fraud to be more than $600 million per year (see
Board of Governors 1996).16 And in cases in which
banks successfully avoid paying fraudulent checks,
the loss is often borne by the party that took the
12. For the U.S. economy as a whole, this ratio (banks’ reserves at the Fed to total daily noncash payments) is on the order of
0.5 percent.
13. For example, the Bank for International Settlements (2001) reports the following statistics on payments usage in the United
States for the year 1999: 68 billion check payments, 26 billion credit or debit card payments, and 6 billion automated clear-
inghouse transfers.
14. Check payments within the United States fall under Federal Reserve Regulations J and CC and under a body of law known
as the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Each of the states has incorporated the UCC into its own laws although there are
some minor inconsistencies across states. A number of legal texts provide useful introductions to check payment law (see,
for example, Mann 1999). For a discussion of issues regarding the finality of check payments, see Mengle (1990) or the Task
Force on Stored-Value Cards (1997).
15. Regulation CC provides for some exceptions to these deadlines. For example, longer holds are allowed on funds deposited
in new accounts.
16. A 1999 survey (quoted in Middlemiss 2001) puts banks’ annual losses at $679 million. The average loss on a bad check was $1,518.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
his bank account (for example, who never checks
his bank records for unauthorized withdrawals).
In many instances this risk allocation rule has
had the desirable effect of encouraging people to
undertake measures to mitigate fraud and other
types of risk. For example, businesses that receive
large numbers of check payments are increasingly
making use of check verification services. Banks are
also using new technologies to limit fraud—for
example, pattern recognition programs that look for
unusual account activity. Many businesses employ
measures designed to verify check disbursements
on their accounts, such as “positive pay” and “reverse
positive pay.”18
Nonetheless the rather stark allocation of risk
implied by the least-cost-avoider principle may
not be appropriate in every payment situation.
Consumers and small businesses, in particular, can
end up bearing significant losses because of fraud
or simply nonpayment of checks. In such cases,
assignment of risk based on a least-cost-avoider
principle is likely to be less effective as the parties
bearing the risk may lack the expertise or where-
withal to effectively limit that risk. And since the
losses involved may be large relative to the wealth
of the individuals involved, many people will find it
advantageous to either insure against the risks of
loss or simply forgo the opportunity to transact.19
One reason for the popularity of alternative means
of payment such as credit cards is that they provide
some degree of insurance against various types of
payment risk, as the discussion below will show.
Payment by Credit Card
A
fter the check, the second most popular form
of noncash payment in the United States is the
credit card. Credit cards, like checks, are a means of
transferring bank claims from payor to payee. A key
difference between the two is that a payment by
credit card does not directly draw funds from the
cardholder’s account but instead draws on a line of
credit established in advance by the card issuer. In
the context of the Chart 2 example, if the consumer
C paid the merchant B by credit card, then C would
not have to go through the formality of applying for
a loan to make the payment but could instead sim-
ply offer the credit card to B.
Credit card payments are supported by a physi-
cal system for clearing payments, by the private
contracts between various participants in the credit
card networks (including cardholders, merchants,
and card issuers as well as other parties), and by a
body of law that governs (among other things) the
finality of such payments.20 However, these con-
check as payment. Aggregate losses (to all parties
involved) from check fraud are commonly said to
exceed $10 billion annually.17
Another way in which the modern-day check pay-
ment system differs from its historical antecedents
is in the value of the check writer’s (“drawer’s” or
“maker’s”) signature. When negotiable instruments
were first developed, the signatures of the relevant
parties were crucial in verifying the authenticity of
the instrument involved. Only principals of merchant
firms could write, accept, or indorse orders to pay;
instruments were written out in longhand; multiple
copies of each instrument were sent by different
means; and many handwriting samples were kept
(Kohn 1999). In modern circumstances, the sheer
volume of checks makes it impractical for banks to
employ these kinds of verification procedures.
Nonetheless, a check’s validity generally rests on the
validity of the signatures on it. For example, if a bank
pays a check on which the check writer’s signature is
forged, the paying bank usually ends up restoring the
funds of the forged check to the depositor on whose
account the check was drawn and bearing the loss
from the forgery. Unfortunately, the depositor is not
always completely protected by this right: until the
forgery is discovered and the funds restored, the
depositor does not enjoy access to the full amount
of funds in his account and may be inadvertently
bouncing checks.
Despite these and many other changes over the
years, the check payment system has by and large
adhered to the principle of assigning risk to the
least-cost avoider. When a bank mistakenly pays a
forged check and suffers a loss as a result, under the
least-cost avoider principle this outcome is seen as
appropriate because the payor bank was in a better
position than any other party to detect the fraud.
But these risks are not entirely borne by banks. A
merchant who provides some good or service in
return for a fraudulent check is also at risk (for the
value of the good or service provided), as is a depos-
itor who is grossly negligent in the management of
There is nothing resembling the concept of
negotiability for credit card payments. In other
words, while just about anyone can pay anyone
by check, credit card payments must flow
through specific channels.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
structs differ substantially from their counterparts
that support check payments. As a consequence,
the implied allocation of risks for credit cards is also
quite different from that for checks.
Perhaps the most basic difference is that there is
nothing resembling the concept of negotiability (in
the sense of general acceptability in exchange) for
credit card payments. In other words, while just
about anyone can pay anyone by check, credit card
payments must flow through specific channels. To
receive payments by credit card, one must have a
merchant account with a credit card company. And
before they can receive credit card payments, holders
of merchant accounts generally have to follow certain
fraud-abatement procedures, such as obtaining elec-
tronic authorization for the payment or obtaining the
payor’s signature in transactions when the payor is
present. Procedures for the clearing of payments
(which in the case of checks are largely left up to
the bank where the check is deposited) proceed in
a fairly uniform way according to the rules of the
credit card company.21
Credit card payments are in this sense more con-
venient than check payments. Credit cards are also
considerably more expensive to the payee since the
credit card company deducts a merchant fee on all
transactions made with its cards.22 Despite these
disadvantages, there are many situations in which
both buyer and seller will prefer payment by credit
card over payment by check. For the seller, the
greatest advantage of a credit card payment is its
higher degree of finality: as the name credit card
implies, the credit risk of the transaction (that is,
the risk that the cardholder cannot pay) is absorbed
by the card issuer. And while credit card companies
do not unconditionally guarantee payment in cases
of fraud, they are willing to absorb a significant per-
centage of losses from unauthorized transactions.23
In short, payment by credit card offers sellers a
greater degree of insurance against various types of
risks than does payment by check.
Payment by credit card also offers advantages for
buyers. Credit cards are useful simply because sell-
ers are willing to accept them in circumstances in
which checks would be unacceptable. Credit cards
have other advantages as well. For example, in some
instances cardholders have the right to withhold
payment of disputed charges, and their liability in
the case of a lost or stolen card is capped at $50.
The rules for credit card payments thus offer a
high degree of assurance to both sides of a given
transaction. A seller who receives a payment by
credit card enjoys a higher degree of payment final-
ity relative to a check payment while the buyer
enjoys widespread acceptance of her credit as well
as additional assurance against theft and fraud.
Providing this insurance to both buyer and seller is
costly, but the costs are to a large extent shared by
all customers of a given credit card issuer so that in
most cases no individual buyer or seller faces an
inordinate risk of loss.
By insulating people from the consequences of
various types of payment risk, however, such risk
spreading generates an undesirable side effect. As
compared to a system based on the least-cost-
avoider principle, a system that emphasizes risk
spreading lessens its participants’ incentives to limit
risk and thus can significantly increase costs. Credit
card companies have sought to contain these risks,
particularly fraud risk, by strictly enforcing rules
about how transactions can occur (for example,
rules for merchant account holders concerning sig-
natures and authorizations) and by aggressive use
of antifraud measures such as pattern recognition
software. Through such efforts the rate of fraud on
credit card transactions has fallen sharply in recent
years, from about 0.18 percent of all transactions in
1995 to 0.06 percent in 1999 (see Fickenscher
2000). Even so, there remains a trade-off of insur-
ance against cost and convenience. In situations
characterized by a relatively high degree of trust
(for example, payment of utility bills or mortgages),
17. See, for example, the National Check Fraud Center at www.ckfraud.org.
18. Under positive pay, a bank will pay only checks whose amounts and other identifying information match the information pre-
viously provided by a depositor. Under reverse positive pay, the depositor himself performs the verification.
19. For example, Prescott and Tatar (1999) note that the risk of an overdrawn bank account is one reason that many low-income
households choose not to have an account.
20. Principal among these laws is the Truth in Lending Act of 1968, which is implemented by Federal Reserve Regulation Z.
21. For a description of the processes for clearing checks and credit card payments, see U.S. General Accounting Office (1997).
22. A 1998 survey by the Food Marketing Institute, cited in Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (2000), puts the merchant’s average cost
of a credit card transaction in a grocery store at $1.07 whereas the average cost of a verified check transaction is about $0.45.
23. A recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1997, 114) estimates the average share of credit card losses borne
by credit card issuers to be 70 percent, with the remainder borne by merchants. The finality of a credit card transaction is
considerably reduced when the cardholder is not physically present at the transaction and cannot sign a charge slip, as is
the case with mail-order, telephone, or Internet transactions. See, for example, Winn (1999) for a discussion.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
high degree of assurance against unauthorized
transactions using their account. However, the degree
of consumer protection guaranteed by law for debit
cards is less than for credit cards. For example, in
some cases, the maximum consumer liability for
unauthorized debit card transactions can exceed
the $50 limit for credit card transactions although
some debit card issuers have voluntarily chosen to
enforce this limit for debit transactions. Also, con-
sumers cannot withhold payment solely because of
dissatisfaction with a purchase. And even in cases
in which a bank restores a depositor’s funds after
an unauthorized transaction, the depositor faces
the risk of a depleted bank account until the funds
are restored.
By definition, debit cards do not involve an auto-
matic extension of credit to the cardholder but
instead draw directly on funds already available in
the cardholder’s bank account.27 Since the debit card
issuer absorbs little or no credit risk, debit card–
based transactions should, at least in theory, be less
costly than credit card–based transactions. This
theoretical cost differential is reflected to different
degrees in the marketplace. The merchant costs of
on-line debit card transactions are well below those
of other noncash forms of payment while costs of
off-line transactions are more comparable to those
for credit card transactions.28
A related type of transaction is known as a point-
of-sale (POS) electronic check conversion. In this
type of transaction, a consumer writes a check at
a retail location or similar point of sale. The check
is then run through a terminal that reads the infor-
mation necessary to convert the check into an
electronic debit to the consumer’s bank account
and verifies the information against a database for
fraud. After this “conversion” (sometimes called
truncation), the check is returned to the consumer,
and the transaction is then cleared through the
automated clearinghouse network (the same net-
work used for direct deposits of payrolls). Because
each transaction is verified and can be settled the
following day, payment by POS check conversion
potentially offers merchants many of the same
finality advantages as those for debit card pay-
ments. This type of transaction is relatively un-
common today, but several major retailers have
announced plans to increase their use of POS check
conversion technology, and many expect this pay-
ment method to find widespread usage within a
few years. 
Because a POS transaction originates as a check
but is cleared as an electronic transaction, there has
been some ambiguity about whether POS check
checks prevail whereas credit cards have come to
dominate in many situations in which goods or ser-
vices are exchanged in fairly anonymous situations
with little recourse to the seller in case of fraud (for
example, paying for restaurant meals).
Debit Cards and Check Conversions
D
ebit cards are the most rapidly growing form of
noncash payment in the United States. From
1995 to 1999, transactions using debit cards grew
from about 1.6 billion transactions (1.9 percent of
all noncash transactions) to 7.5 billion transac-
tions (about 7.5 percent) (Bank for International
Settlements 2001). The finality rules for payments
by debit card are interesting because in many
respects they are intermediate between those for
checks and credit cards.24
While debit cards and credit cards are similar in
appearance, their functions are quite different.25
Rather than drawing on a pre-established line of
credit, as is done in a credit transaction, a debit
card draws on funds already in the cardholder’s
bank account. There are two types of debit cards,
on-line (or PIN-based) and off-line (or “signature-
based”).26 In an on-line debit card transaction, the
cardholder authorizes the transaction by entering a
personal identification number, or PIN, at the point
of sale. In an off-line transaction, the cardholder
authorizes the transaction by a signature, just as for a
credit card transaction. Historically, the two types of
debit card transactions have also been cleared in dif-
ferent ways, with on-line transactions being cleared
through regional automatic teller machine (ATM)
networks while off-line transactions are cleared
through the same channels as credit card payments.
Debit cards offer sellers many of the same
advantages as credit cards do—principally, assur-
ances of payment finality. As discussed above, this
finality is useful to buyers as well because it allows
them to conduct transactions in situations in
which check payments would be unacceptable to
the seller. Buyers (consumers) are also afforded a
Debit cards offer sellers many of the same
advantages as credit cards do—principally,
assurances of payment finality.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
conversions should be treated legally as a check or
as an electronic payment. Recently, the Fed issued
an official interpretation (Board of Governors 2001)
that such transactions do qualify as electronic funds
transfers and hence are governed by the same legal
framework as debit card transactions. Thus, a buyer
whose check is converted at the point of sale enjoys
essentially the same legal protections (under
Regulation E) as would a buyer who made the same
purchase with a debit card.29
In short, payment by either debit card or POS
check conversion offers a higher degree of payment
finality than a check payment. Buyers who use
these means of payment are not guaranteed the
same degree of insurance against certain risks as
those who pay by credit card. Nevertheless, these
types of payments may be more efficient in certain
situations, because their cost per transaction can be
substantially lower than that of credit cards.
Summary and Conclusion
P
ayment finality is critical to the process of
decentralized exchange. By specifying the cir-
cumstances in which the transfer of one type of
claim extinguishes another, finality rules fulfill two
important roles. The first is to minimize opportuni-
ties for default along the credit chains that arise in
any developed economy. The second is to allocate
other risks, such as fraud, that naturally arise in the
course of exchange.
While all payment systems incorporate some
notion of finality, different systems have different
finality rules that imply different risk allocations
among system participants. The finality of check
payments is in general quite tentative, and the risks
in the payment process are often concentrated on a
single party. Credit and debit card payments, in
contrast, are generally more final than check pay-
ments, and the liability for potential losses in the
payment process tends to be shared among partici-
pants in these systems.
It should be emphasized that one set of finality
rules is not necessarily better than another in all
situations. The law governing check payments, for
example, recognizes that such payments are by
their very nature quite dispersed and cannot always
be subjected to outside verification. This advantage
of check payment makes it easy to pay virtually
anyone by check but at the same time makes it very
difficult to control risks. The solution to this prob-
lem, developed over centuries of experience, has
been to encourage people to limit these risks by
concentrating risk on the party or parties best able
to avoid it.
Card payments work on a different principle.
Because the laws governing such payments effec-
tively insulate cardholders from many types of pay-
ment risk, issuers of credit and debit cards have no
choice but to sharply restrict the circumstances
under which such payments can be accepted and to
intensively monitor payments for fraud. But, by
imposing such limitations, card issuers are able to
guarantee a higher degree of payment finality than
for check payments.
Continuing progress in communications technol-
ogy will offer the potential for improvements in
these trade-offs. New technologies in on-line pay-
ments, for example, may allow for convenient, person-
to-person payments between consumers with a
higher degree of finality than is offered by check
payments. And smart-card technology may enable
card issuers to reduce the fraud risk associated with
card payment. No matter what form these new
technologies may take, however, the essential ser-
vice they offer will be the same—the provision of
payment finality.
24. Rules for debit card payments are governed in large part by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978 and Federal Reserve
Regulation E.
25. In many cases the same physical card can be used as either a debit card or a credit card. For purposes of the discussion here,
such cards will be treated as two distinct cards.
26. Again, a single debit card may function as either an on-line or off-line card.
27. Both on-line and off-line debit cards require the use of verification systems to insure that a cardholder can make a payment
before the payment is authorized.
28. The survey quoted in Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (2000) puts the average merchant cost of an on-line debit transaction
at $0.29 versus $0.80 for an off-line transaction. As of October 2001, the cost of a $40 on-line transaction cleared over Visa’s
Interlink network was $0.20 versus $0.60 for an off-line transaction (ATM & Debit News 2001).
29. The Fed’s interpretation (Board of Governors 2001) also allows for conversion of checks at payment processing or “lockbox”
locations. Such conversions are sometimes subject to additional requirements beyond those for POS conversions. A plain-
English summary of the rules for check conversion is available from the Fed (Board of Governors 2002).12 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
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